RevDuck’s “Jewels” Scheme

How a Great Portland Street Shell Company Enables an Affilka-Driven Illegal Casino Network

A structured scheme internally referred to as the “Jewels” operation—linking Ukrainian nationals, London-based shell entities, and the SoftSwiss-powered RevDuck ecosystem—has come into sharper focus. Newly obtained intelligence shows that Lyntec Limited, a UK-registered company on Great Portland Street, functions as a payment intermediary, routing illicit fiat deposits while falsely presenting them as ordinary “IT consultancy” revenues.

The investigative trail ties the HolyLuck / TrueLuck / Booms.bet casino cluster to a centrally coordinated offshore setup that projects a veneer of UK legitimacy through London addresses while relying technically on the SoftSwiss / Affilka infrastructure previously examined by Scam-Or Project. What has been marketed as a decentralized affiliate environment increasingly appears to be a unified “Jewels” payment-and-branding construct controlled by Ukrainian operators.

“GEMCEBR”: A Case Study in Descriptor-Based Transaction Laundering

Analysis of player bank statements repeatedly reveals the payment reference “GEMCEBR LONDON GBR.” These deposits do not correspond to any lawful marketplace or commercial service. Instead, they are directly linked to funding unlicensed gambling platforms, including HolyLuck and TrueLuck.

This payment label is a textbook indicator of Transaction Laundering (TL).

Functional Breakdown of the Scheme

• Compliance Evasion Layer
  The “GEMCEBR” label closely mirrors the name of the legitimate Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), a tactic designed to bypass automated bank and card-scheme monitoring systems.
• Internal Syndicate Marker
  The “GEM” element acts as an internal signature associated with the “Jewels” group, connecting multiple offshore entities such as Sapphire Summit S.R.L. and Gem Limitada.
• External Corroboration
  Independent player forums and dispute reports list “GEMCEBR, London” among descriptors encountered in chargebacks involving Curaçao-linked casinos and merchant-category inconsistencies.

This pattern aligns with earlier Scam-Or Project findings showing that Sapphire Summit S.R.L. (reg. no. 3-102-903325) is repeatedly reused across several brands and enforcement cases, including the Dutch regulator’s sanction against Booms.bet.

Great Portland Street as a Transaction-Laundering Conduit

The operation relies heavily on virtual office infrastructures at 167–169 and 85 Great Portland Street, London, locations frequently associated with high-risk payment fronts.

Lyntec Limited: The UK Payment Façade

• Corporate Profile
  Lyntec Limited (Company No. 15919943) was incorporated in August 2024 and formally registered as an IT consultancy.
• Beneficial Control
  Corporate filings identify Ukrainian nationals Maksym Buriachenko and Kyrylo Lehkodukh as controlling figures (until November 2025).
• Strategic Purpose
  The consultancy designation allows Lyntec to access mainstream UK banking services, enabling card-based fiat processing that would otherwise be rejected if transparently labeled as gambling-related.

Within Scam-Or Project’s risk classification, such Great Portland Street “consultancy” structures are a recurring feature of transaction-laundering models designed to reclassify gambling proceeds as routine B2B income.

Ukrainian Operational Control and the RevDuck–Lyntec Interface

A whistleblower’s assertion that both the operational core (RevDuck) and the payment layer (Lyntec) are Ukrainian-controlled finds growing indirect confirmation.

• Multiple industry sources and earlier Scam-Or Project dossiers describe RevDuck’s operational teams as predominantly Ukrainian.
• RevDuck is structurally embedded in the SoftSwiss / Affilka ecosystem.
• Although no formal corporate linkage between RevDuck and Lyntec appears in public registries, the convergence of nationality, identical London infrastructure, and shared casino brands points toward coordinated control rather than parallel activity.

Payment Flow Reconstruction: Lyntec, GEMCEBR, and SoftSwiss

From a regulatory and compliance perspective, the payment flow exhibits all core indicators of organized transaction laundering:

1. Players from restricted jurisdictions—most notably the Netherlands—initiate fiat card deposits under a neutral UK-based descriptor.
2. Lyntec Limited is presented as the merchant of record, concealing the gambling purpose from issuing banks and card networks.
3. Funds are subsequently transferred to offshore operating entities, including Sapphire Summit S.R.L. (Costa Rica) and other “Gem”-linked vehicles connected to TrueLuck, HolyLuck, and Booms.bet (TrueLuck sister sites).

Earlier Scam-Or Project investigations established that RevDuck operates on SoftSwiss’s Affilka platform, which provides affiliate tracking, reporting, and payout mechanisms. The Lyntec component now indicates that, alongside crypto-based rails, dedicated UK shell companies are deployed specifically to process card transactions under misleading commercial classifications.

Key Entities and Structural Links

Conclusion and Request for Evidence

The portrayal of RevDuck as a neutral affiliate intermediary is no longer tenable. The repeated use of jewel-themed branding, reliance on Sapphire Summit S.R.L., deployment of Great Portland Street shell infrastructure, Ukrainian beneficial ownership of Lyntec Limited, and deep integration with Affilka collectively indicate a single, centrally managed illegal iGaming structure, not a loose network of independent actors.

Scam-Or Project will continue examining Lyntec Limited (15919943), the GEMCEBR descriptor, and related banking relationships as potential transaction-laundering channels within the broader RevDuck / SoftSwiss ecosystem.

Industry insiders—including current or former employees of Lyntec, RevDuck, SoftSwiss/Affilka clients, payment processors, or banks encountering GEMCEBR-tagged transactions—are encouraged to submit documentation via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section. All submissions are handled confidentially and may play a decisive role in regulatory or law-enforcement intervention.