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THE SKRILL ADMISSION

THE SKRILL ADMISSION

Payment Giant Confirms Briantie Limited and Cyperion Solutions Limited as “Official Partners” Amid Massive Identity Theft Allegations

In a striking response to a customer complaint, payment heavyweight Skrill has formally acknowledged that the shell entities Briantie Limited and Cyperion Solutions Limited are “on-boarded merchants” that successfully passed its internal compliance procedures.

Although Skrill admitted that 28 disputed transactions were debited from the victim’s bank account, it rejected any responsibility. The company argued that no contractual relationship exists between Skrill and the payers who used its gateway infrastructure.

This position raises significant questions about liability, merchant oversight, and the structural design of Skrill’s payment architecture.

The Skrill Gateway and the Mechanics of Transaction Routing

Skrill’s written reply to the complainant provides critical insight for regulators and compliance experts. While refusing to refund the transactions, Skrill simultaneously confirmed the merchant status of the entities involved.

This dual position highlights what appears to be a structural vulnerability within the European payments framework.

1. Official Confirmation of the Shell Merchant Network

Skrill explicitly confirmed that:

  • Cyperion Solutions Limited
  • Briantie Limited

are official Skrill merchants.

These entities were previously identified as financial shells connected to the Galaktika N.V. / SoftSwiss ecosystem. Skrill listed 28 individual transactions conducted between December 2025 and January 2026 that were processed via its “Quick Checkout” gateway and routed to these merchants.

The company’s email response, while rejecting the complaint, reveals several critical elements:

  • All disputed transactions were categorized as gateway payments via Skrill Quick Checkout.
  • Skrill states it acts solely on behalf of the merchant, not the payer.
  • Therefore, such payments do not appear in the user’s Skrill wallet transaction history.
  • The transactions were processed for Cyperion Solutions Limited and Briantie Limited, including related “subsidiaries, license holders, or payment processors.”
  • Skrill classified both entities as approved merchants that had “passed all relevant checks.”
  • Skrill declared itself “satisfied” with the business relationship.
  • Despite acknowledging allegations of illegal gambling and transaction laundering, Skrill declined to uphold the complaint.
  • Responsibility was redirected toward the merchants and competent authorities.
  • Skrill permanently closed the victim’s wallet account, stating security concerns and preventative measures against further misuse of personal data.

2. The “No Contract” Argument

Skrill’s central defense rests on a contractual distinction. For “gateway payments,” it claims to provide services exclusively to the merchant — not the payer.

Under this interpretation, Skrill can:

  1. Debit a bank account under the reference SKR*Skrill.com.
  2. Transfer the funds to offshore-linked merchant shells.
  3. Deny liability for the legality, safety, or nature of the underlying service.

This framework reinforces findings previously reported by Scam-Or Project, suggesting that what has been described as the “Shadow Skrill” mechanism is embedded within the Quick Checkout structure itself.

Skrill’s Responsibility Framework

Skrill distinguishes strictly between:

Payment Type Contractual Relationship
Wallet Payment User ↔ Skrill
Gateway / Quick Checkout Merchant ↔ Skrill

Based on this distinction, Skrill asserts that:

  • It merely supplies a technical payment environment.
  • It does not guarantee the legality of merchant services.
  • Disputes must be directed to merchants rather than Skrill.

This model reflects a classic limitation-of-liability structure: the processor acknowledges handling the transaction but declines any obligation to assess legality or compensate affected users beyond account closure.

3. Account Closure Instead of Remediation

Following the report of identity theft, Skrill permanently terminated the victim’s account for “security reasons.”

While the merchants allegedly linked to the fraudulent activity remain approved and operational, the complainant was removed from the platform. The closure also eliminated the user’s access to internal dispute channels.

4. The KYB and Merchant Monitoring Question

Skrill maintains that Cyperion Solutions Limited and Briantie Limited passed “all relevant checks.”

However:

  • Cyperion Solutions Ltd is registered in the UK as a “Management Consultancy” (SIC 70229).
  • The entity allegedly processed high volumes of payments connected to unlicensed Curaçao casino brands such as Slotoro and Boomerang-Bet.

If accurate, this raises questions about Skrill’s Know Your Business (KYB) and ongoing merchant monitoring procedures.

Allowing a consultancy-classified entity to facilitate gambling-related flows may indicate weaknesses in risk assessment or merchant profiling mechanisms.

Conclusion: A Regulatory Crossroads

Skrill’s formal response demonstrates that the Galaktika N.V. network does not operate entirely outside regulated infrastructure. Instead, it appears to interface directly with established European payment institutions.

By providing technical payment routing while simultaneously disclaiming liability, Skrill positions itself as an infrastructure provider rather than a responsible financial intermediary. Critics argue that this structure effectively enables the operational backbone of what has been described as the “Cloaked Casino Clan.”

The broader question for regulators is whether such gateway architectures comply with anti-money laundering obligations and merchant oversight expectations under European financial supervision standards.

The “Shadow Skrill” Structure Overview

Entity / Instrument Documentation Source Alleged Role
Paygate Skrill Confirmation Emails Technical receiver/gateway acting as routing layer for fund transfers
NGPayments Bank Statements / Skrill Emails Payment rail masking gambling deposits
Briantie Limited Bank Statement Cyprus-based shell receiving high-volume deposits, described as “Payment Agent”
Cyperion Solutions Transaction ID Logs PayFac shell registered as “Management consultancy” (SIC 70229); transactions labeled as IT consultancy
Novaforge Limited Skrill Confirmation Logs Secondary beneficiary shell activated when primary accounts are restricted

The documentation places Paygate at the center of the Galaktika / Wiraon transaction infrastructure. It functions as the technical intermediary enabling multiple shell entities to connect with regulated payment institutions such as Skrill without triggering immediate compliance alerts.

Whistleblower Notice

If you are a current or former employee of Skrill or Paysafe and possess information regarding the approval or compliance review of Cyperion Solutions Limited, Briantie Limited, or Paygate, you may share information confidentially via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section.

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