Yapily, Klyme, Mega.bet: Fresh Whistleblower Evidence Suggests a Controversial Open-Banking Casino Payment Rail

A newly submitted whistleblower file reviewed by Scam-Or Project introduces additional evidence in the ongoing Yapily–Klyme case. The materials include a transaction ledger, email correspondence, and a payment-flow screenshot indicating that Mega.bet utilized a Klyme-branded “Pay by Bank” system, with Immix Solutions Ltd listed as the payee.

The emerging structure raises serious concerns: player funds appear to have traveled through a multi-layered chain involving a UK-based technology intermediary, a Cyprus-linked payments entity, and a Lithuanian beneficiary account. Meanwhile, Yapily remains the prominent regulated open-banking provider operating in the background. The company openly promotes pay-by-bank solutions for iGaming, and the Bank of Lithuania confirms that its Lithuanian entity holds a licensed payment institution status.

Key Findings

• A whistleblower dataset reviewed by Scam-Or Project shows repeated transfers from a Dutch ABN AMRO account to IBAN LT53 5030 1200 0000 0804, suggesting an ongoing collection account rather than isolated transactions.
• A payment screenshot reveals Mega.bet using a “Pay by Bank” interface powered by Klyme, with Immix Solutions Ltd explicitly identified as the payee.
• In correspondence provided by the player, Klyme allegedly acknowledged the existence of a merchant relationship, confirmed that transactions occurred, and stated that the merchant was later terminated.
• Klyme reportedly issued an incorrect termination date initially and later corrected it to 7 April 2025, raising questions about internal controls and complaint handling.
• Yapily Connect UAB is officially listed as a licensed payment institution by the Bank of Lithuania.
• Yapily actively markets open-banking solutions for iGaming operators and PSPs, including pay-by-bank deposit flows.
• Immix Solutions Ltd presents itself publicly as a Cyprus-based provider offering settlement, escrow, and payment-processing services.

Compliance Analysis

The earlier Scam-Or Project report on Yapily already highlighted a troubling pattern: instead of treating offshore casino activity as a potential merchant-risk issue, the compliance focus appeared to shift toward managing the complaining user. Internal communication cited in that report allegedly instructed Klyme to blacklist the whistleblower instead of addressing the underlying gambling-related risks.

The newly submitted evidence deepens these concerns.

The transaction ledger shows repeated deposits from a Dutch account into a Lithuanian IBAN across late 2024 and March 2025. This pattern is consistent with an operational payment rail rather than accidental or one-off consumer activity.

The Payment Screenshot

The most critical piece of evidence is a screenshot from the payment process:

• Mega.bet displays a Klyme-powered “Pay by Bank” interface
• Immix Solutions Ltd is listed as the payee

This combination suggests a direct operational chain rather than a purely technical or indirect relationship.

The Role of Immix Solutions Ltd

Interestingly, the whistleblower did not emphasize Immix in the initial complaint—but the screenshot did.

Public information from immix.pro positions Immix Solutions Ltd as a Cyprus-based payments company providing:

• Settlement services
• Escrow functionality
• Payment processing

This aligns with the type of entity typically found in layered payment structures designed to obscure transaction flows.

Structural Overview of the Payment Flow

Based on available data, the structure appears as follows:

1. A player deposits funds into an offshore-style gambling platform (Mega.bet)
2. The payment interface is branded and operated by Klyme
3. The listed payee is Immix Solutions Ltd (Cyprus)
4. Funds are routed to a Lithuanian IBAN account
5. Yapily infrastructure appears to underpin the open-banking layer

While this does not conclusively prove Yapily’s direct handling of every transaction, it strongly supports the plausibility of the whistleblower’s claims from both a commercial and structural perspective.

Regulatory Context

Yapily actively promotes its services to iGaming operators and PSPs, emphasizing:

• Simplified onboarding
• Efficient deposit flows
• Open-banking integration for gambling platforms

The Lithuanian connection is particularly important. The Bank of Lithuania confirms that Yapily Connect UAB holds a valid payment institution license and operates within the open-banking framework post-Brexit.

This creates a problematic regulatory picture:

• A regulated open-banking provider
• A payment flow linked to offshore gambling
• Multiple intermediaries across jurisdictions

Klyme’s Position

According to the whistleblower correspondence:

• Klyme allegedly confirmed onboarding the merchant
• The merchant later breached terms and was terminated
• The termination date was initially misreported

If accurate, this suggests that Klyme had:

• A direct merchant relationship
• Oversight responsibility
• Active involvement in the payment flow

This weakens the argument that Klyme functioned purely as a neutral technology provider.

Summary Table

Key Questions

For Yapily

• Did Yapily Connect Ltd or Yapily Connect UAB provide infrastructure for transactions linked to Mega.bet or related merchants?
• What risk controls are applied when intermediaries use Yapily rails for offshore gambling?
• Why did earlier handling focus on user management instead of merchant-risk transparency?

For Klyme

• Did Klyme onboard the merchant behind the Mega.bet flow?
• Why was the termination date initially incorrect?
• What was Klyme’s precise function in the payment chain?
• What relationship exists, if any, with Immix Solutions Ltd?

For Immix Solutions Ltd

• Why did the company appear as payee in this payment flow?
• Was it acting as a payment agent, settlement intermediary, or collection entity?
• Which high-risk or gambling merchants did it service during the relevant period?

Conclusion

The new whistleblower submission does not resolve the case—it expands it.

The combination of a Klyme-branded Mega.bet payment interface, Immix Solutions Ltd as payee, a Lithuanian beneficiary account, and Klyme’s reported acknowledgment of a terminated merchant relationship shifts the narrative. This is no longer just a player complaint—it is a broader compliance issue involving open-banking infrastructure and cross-border payment routing.

Yapily’s active positioning in the iGaming sector further intensifies scrutiny.

The central question now is straightforward:

Who within this payment chain was aware of the structure, and why was the whistleblower treated as the issue instead of the underlying risk?

If you have worked with Yapily, Klyme, Immix Solutions, or related PSPs and banking partners involved in offshore gambling flows, Scam-Or Project invites you to share information via its whistleblower section. Relevant materials include:

• Merchant onboarding documentation
• KYB/KYC records
• Beneficiary account data
• Internal escalation logs
• Geo-restriction decisions
• Complaint-handling records