The OpenPayd–Klickl Fraud Rail: New Victim Records Indicate Large-Scale Sweeps To Polish Crypto Entity

Massive Flow Of Victim Funds Through OpenPayd And Klickl Europe

Scam-Or Project has reviewed a newly obtained batch of OpenPayd payment summaries collected by victims of fraudulent investment operations. The documents reveal a highly repetitive and structured transaction pattern: victim deposits were first sent to OpenPayd vIBANs and then rapidly transferred to Klickl Europe Sp. z o.o. using the reference “Sweep to Primary Account.”

The reviewed files indicate that hundreds of thousands of Euros moved through this OpenPayd–Klickl payment rail. The evidence suggests this was not an isolated incident involving a single victim or one fraudulent platform, but rather a scalable payment-processing structure tied to multiple suspected investment scams.

2-Minute Briefing

Scam-Or Project examined a new series of OpenPayd payment summaries obtained by victims through GDPR/DSAR requests. The records consistently display the same transaction sequence:

Victim Payin → OpenPayd Transfer → Klickl Europe → “Sweep to Primary Account”

The analyzed payment summaries show that every reviewed victim payment routed through OpenPayd was subsequently transferred to:

• KLICKL EUROPE SP.z.o.o.
• BIC: CFTEMTM1
• Receiver Account: MT82CFTE28004000000000004379006

This further supports the central finding already identified by Scam-Or Project:

• OpenPayd supplied the vIBAN collection infrastructure
• Klickl Europe received the swept funds originating from victims

OpenPayd’s own GDPR response reportedly confirmed the operational structure. According to the response:

• OpenPayd provides services exclusively to corporate clients
• Klickl Europe was identified as the relevant corporate customer
• The vIBANs were “named virtual IBANs” connected to Klickl Europe’s payment account
• Funds credited to these accounts became the property of Klickl Europe

The newly reviewed victim material significantly expands the scope of the case. The transaction pattern is no longer limited to KXTRA or a single Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore-related victim. Instead, the evidence points toward a broader fraud-payment infrastructure targeting mainly German-speaking victims.

The legitimate Peel Hunt organization has publicly warned investors that it does not conduct regulated investment business through WhatsApp channels, downloadable apps, or social media communications. The company stated that applications and WhatsApp groups using its branding are fraudulent and unrelated to the real firm.

The findings also resemble patterns described in OCCRP’s “Scam Empire” investigations, which documented how large-scale investment-fraud organizations rely on payment intermediaries and banking structures to collect victim deposits. The OpenPayd/Klickl transaction flow appears consistent with that operational model.

Key Findings

Repetitive And Structured Transaction Flow

The newly reviewed records reveal a systematic transfer mechanism.

Victim deposits entering OpenPayd vIBANs were almost immediately followed by outgoing transfers to Klickl Europe carrying the description:

“Sweep to Primary Account”

Same Receiver Account Appears Repeatedly

The recipient details remain identical across multiple victim files:

The repeated appearance of the same account strongly suggests centralized fund collection.

Verified Victim Flows Already Exceed €665,000

A conservative review of readable Excel files and PDF payment summaries identified at least €665,733.74

in victim-related transfers processed through this payment structure.

Victims Primarily Came From German-Speaking Countries

The reviewed banking records predominantly contained:

• German IBANs
• Austrian bank accounts

This aligns with previously documented KXTRA and fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore victim activity.

OpenPayd’s GDPR Response Confirms The Structure

According to the reviewed GDPR response, OpenPayd stated that:

• vIBANs function as reconciliation tools for corporate customers
• The relevant payment account belonged to Klickl Europe
• Funds credited to that account became Klickl Europe’s property

Klickl Europe Was Not An Incidental Recipient

Klickl publicly states that Klickl Europe is:

• incorporated in Poland
• registered under KRS 0001053580
• listed under Polish virtual-asset registration RD WWW-930

The registration reportedly covers:

• virtual-asset exchange services
• brokerage activities
• virtual-asset account operations

The Issue Goes Beyond Administrative Compliance

If multiple fraudulent investment brands directed victims through OpenPayd vIBANs into Klickl Europe accounts, regulators may need to evaluate the structure as a potential payment-enabled investment-fraud network rather than an isolated compliance matter.

Key Data Table

Rail Structure Overview

Known Payment Flow

Victim Bank Account → OpenPayd Named vIBAN → Immediate Transfer / “Sweep to Primary Account” → Klickl Europe Corporate Account → Crypto On-Ramp / Settlement Layer → Unknown Scam Operators

Known Scam Frontends

The following fraudulent brands have so far been connected to the rail:

• KXTRA / KKR Global Investment → OpenPayd → Klickl Europe
• Fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore → OpenPayd → Klickl Europe

Working Hypothesis

Additional fake investment brands may have relied on the same OpenPayd–Klickl infrastructure.

Scam-Or Project Assessment

Established Facts

OpenPayd’s GDPR response reportedly confirmed that the relevant vIBANs were connected to Klickl Europe’s payment account and that incoming funds became Klickl Europe’s property.

The Humer payment summary reportedly documented Payins totaling €100,500, followed by transfers to Klickl Europe labeled:

“Sweep to Primary Account”

The newly reviewed Excel payment summaries show the same structure repeating across additional victims.

Strong Inferences

The available evidence indicates the existence of a structured victim-fund collection mechanism.

• OpenPayd supplied the vIBAN infrastructure
• Klickl Europe received the funds
• The same receiver account repeatedly appeared
• The same sweep reference repeatedly appeared

The repeated consistency of the transfers does not resemble random payment activity.

Working Hypotheses

One possibility is that Klickl Europe functioned as a crypto on-ramp or settlement layer for the operators behind KXTRA, Peelhuntaicore, and related fraudulent brands.

A stronger — but currently unproven — hypothesis is that Klickl Europe may have been more deeply connected to the underlying fraud structure than a passive payment processor.

Further evidence would be required to establish that conclusion.

Open Questions

Several important questions remain unresolved:

• Who was the ultimate customer behind the Klickl transaction flows?
• Were the funds converted into cryptocurrency?
• Which wallets, exchanges, or OTC desks ultimately received the assets?
• Did OpenPayd or Klickl submit SARs/STRs?
• When was the suspicious pattern first identified internally?
• Why was the payment rail allegedly allowed to continue operating?

Whistleblower And Victim Call

Scam-Or Project is collecting additional evidence, including:

• OpenPayd GDPR responses
• OpenPayd “Summary of Payments” Excel files
• vIBAN records
• Sender bank receipts
• App screenshots
• WhatsApp conversations
• Fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore materials
• KXTRA screenshots
• Wallet addresses
• Transaction hashes
• Klickl responses
• Police reports
• Regulatory complaints

Victims are encouraged to submit materials through the Scam-Or Project Complaints section.

Where one individual submits files on behalf of other victims, written consent should be obtained beforehand.