Player Complaint Raises Questions About Alleged Open-Banking Casino Rail Involving Yapily, Pellopay, And UAB Travel Union

A newly submitted player complaint has drawn attention to a suspected Open-Banking payment corridor allegedly used to fund offshore casino activity through regulated financial infrastructure. According to documents reviewed by Scam-Or Project, the reported payment chain involved Yapily Connect UAB, Pellopay Finance LTD, UAB Travel Union, Paysolo/Contiant, and the offshore casino brand Immerion.

The complaint suggests a recurring pattern previously observed in offshore gambling investigations: casino deposits allegedly processed through regulated Open-Banking channels while the visible SEPA recipient was not the casino operator itself, but an intermediary payment entity.

The complainant’s identity is known to Scam-Or Project but has been withheld for privacy reasons.

Overview Of The Alleged Payment Structure

According to the submitted dossier, the player initiated deposits in February 2026 through an Open-Banking flow involving Yapily Connect UAB. The payment route allegedly passed through a Paysolo/Contiant interface, while the visible recipient displayed in the player’s banking records was Pellopay Finance LTD, operating through Lithuanian account infrastructure connected to UAB Travel Union.

The casino allegedly credited through this structure was:

• Immerion Casino

Alleged Payment Rail

The central compliance concern is straightforward: according to the complaint, the player funded a casino account, yet the visible SEPA beneficiary shown in banking records was Pellopay Finance LTD rather than Immerion Casino.

Payment Evidence And Technical Documentation

The submitted material reportedly goes beyond ordinary player complaints and includes screenshots and technical records allegedly linking the casino cashier flow to regulated Open-Banking infrastructure.

Evidence Submitted

The screenshots allegedly show the player being redirected from a Paysolo-branded payment page into a Yapily-powered authentication process using Revolut EU. Completed transfers reportedly displayed Pellopay Finance LTD as the payment recipient while corresponding casino balances were credited on Immerion Casino.

According to the documents, transfers included amounts such as €100, €130, €200, and €400.

Paysolo Identified As Key Checkout Layer

The complaint places Paysolo at the visible Open-Banking checkout stage. Scam-Or Project has previously identified openbanking.paysolo.net in payment corridors connected to offshore casino activity involving Pagagate, Urbenics, and Revolut-related flows.

In this case, Paysolo allegedly acted as the bridge between the casino cashier environment and the Yapily/Pellopay payment initiation process.

Several unresolved questions emerge from the evidence:

• Who operates the Paysolo gateway?
• Who contracted Paysolo for this payment flow?
• What merchant information was passed downstream?
• Did downstream providers know the end-use involved offshore gambling?

Scam-Or Project states that it has not yet determined whether Paysolo was directly connected to Immerion, Pellopay, Yapily, Contiant, or another intermediary party.

Yapily: “We Only Provide PIS/AIS Infrastructure”

The complainant also submitted correspondence allegedly received from Yapily’s compliance department. According to the communication, Yapily described itself strictly as a regulated PIS/AIS infrastructure provider and stated that it:

• does not open or manage accounts,
• does not control customer funds,
• does not process transfers itself,
• and cannot reverse payments because it is neither the sending nor receiving bank.

That explanation may technically reflect Yapily’s licensed role. However, it does not eliminate broader compliance questions.

The central issue is whether regulated Open-Banking infrastructure may have been repeatedly used to facilitate offshore casino funding through intermediary payment structures.

Key questions include:

1. Who was Yapily’s direct commercial client?
2. Was the gambling nature of the transactions disclosed?
3. Were gambling-related risk controls applied?
4. Why was the casino not transparently identified as the end beneficiary?

Pellopay Finance LTD As Visible Payee

Pellopay Finance LTD appears throughout the submitted evidence as the visible SEPA payment recipient. According to the complaint, the player believed funds were destined for Immerion Casino while banking records instead reflected Pellopay as beneficiary.

The evidence package reportedly includes:

• Paysolo checkout screens,
• Yapily payment initiation references,
• Revolut payment receipts,
• and correspondence attributed to Pellopay.

The complainant also submitted a response allegedly stating that Pellopay considered the matter outside its responsibility because the payment had already been processed and forwarded to the merchant.

Gmail Support Communication Raises Additional Questions

A further concern highlighted in the complaint involves customer support communications allegedly originating from a Gmail address rather than an official Pellopay corporate domain.

That raises several unresolved questions:

Scam-Or Project notes that in opaque gambling payment structures, the payment intermediary is often the only entity visible to both the player and the bank.

UAB Travel Union Named As Account Infrastructure

The Revolut transaction receipts reportedly identify UAB Travel Union as the banking/account infrastructure layer associated with the Pellopay recipient account.

Scam-Or Project does not allege that UAB Travel Union knowingly processed unlawful casino transactions. Nevertheless, the complaint raises compliance-related questions regarding:

• the nature of Pellopay’s underlying merchants,
• transaction monitoring,
• gambling-related payment classification,
• and AML oversight obligations.

According to the complainant, UAB Travel Union initially indicated that the matter would be reviewed but later ceased responding.

Parallel Lead: Techoptions And Hellspin

The dossier reportedly also contains a second payment trail involving Techoptions (CY) Group Ltd and ISX Financial.

Submitted materials allegedly show:

• Yapily-powered payment pages,
• Techoptions merchant references,
• and Revolut transaction evidence routed through ISX Financial.

Techoptions publicly describes itself as an online casino management company associated with Hellspin and Ivibet and identifies Techoptions (CY) Group Ltd, based in Nicosia, as billing agent.

This additional lead may indicate that the issue extends beyond a single merchant relationship.

According to Scam-Or Project, the emerging pattern suggests that regulated Open-Banking rails may have been repeatedly used in connection with offshore gambling payment structures.

KYC Requests And Potential Data-Sharing Concerns

The complainant additionally submitted screenshots showing KYC requests allegedly originating from both Immerion and Ybets. The requests reportedly demanded:

• copies of identity documents,
• selfies with identification,
• and additional verification materials.

The complainant claims these requests appeared after disputes were raised and states there had been no direct interaction with Ybets.

Scam-Or Project describes this as a potential data-sharing concern rather than proof of a GDPR violation.

Possible explanations mentioned include:

• shared ownership structures,
• shared affiliate systems,
• common KYC providers,
• shared CRM environments,
• or unauthorized circulation of player data.

Scam-Or Project Assessment

According to Scam-Or Project, the complaint file includes:

• Open-Banking confirmation records,
• Revolut payment receipts,
• Pellopay beneficiary information,
• UAB Travel Union account references,
• Yapily compliance correspondence,
• Pellopay responses,
• casino deposit screenshots,
• GDPR/Open-Banking transaction references,
• and the Techoptions/Hellspin parallel lead.

The investigation currently points toward one central issue:

regulated Open-Banking infrastructure allegedly being used to fund offshore casino accounts while intermediary entities — not casinos — appeared as visible SEPA beneficiaries.

Scam-Or Project argues that this creates a broader regulatory and compliance issue rather than merely a private customer dispute.

Questions Directed To The Involved Parties

Scam-Or Project states that it intends to seek responses from Yapily, Pellopay, UAB Travel Union, and Immerion regarding the following issues:

1. Did Yapily Connect UAB initiate payment flows funding Immerion Casino accounts?
2. Who was Yapily’s direct client?
3. Was the gambling-related purpose disclosed?
4. Why was Pellopay Finance LTD displayed as payee instead of the casino?
5. Who was the merchant-of-record behind the payment collection flow?
6. What due diligence was conducted on the underlying merchants?
7. What role did UAB Travel Union play in the account infrastructure?
8. Were these flows classified internally as gambling-related?
9. Were AML escalations or suspicious activity reports generated?
10. Are Immerion and Ybets operationally connected?

Call For Information

Scam-Or Project is seeking confidential information from:

• players who used Open Banking, Revolut, Yapily, Paysolo, Contiant, Pellopay, or UAB Travel Union for casino deposits;
• individuals who saw Pellopay Finance LTD appear as payment beneficiary;
• insiders connected to Yapily, Pellopay, UAB Travel Union, Paysolo, Contiant, ISX Financial, Techoptions, Immerion, or related cashier providers;
• compliance professionals familiar with Open-Banking gambling payment flows.

Information may be submitted confidentially through the Scam-Or Project Complaints platform.

Open Banking was designed to improve payment efficiency and transparency — not to operate as a hidden cashier infrastructure for offshore gambling networks.