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OpenPayd Malta vIBAN Appears Again In Alleged Crypto Romance Scam Infrastructure

OpenPayd Malta vIBAN Appears Again In Alleged Crypto Romance Scam Infrastructure

Another Malta CFTE vIBAN Surfaces In A Crypto-Fraud Payment Trail

Scam-Or Project has received another victim report involving an OpenPayd-linked Malta vIBAN, BIC/SWIFT CFTEMTM1, and crypto transfers connected to a suspected fraudulent trading platform. While this case differs from the previously reported OpenPayd/Klickl Europe files, it appears to reinforce a broader and recurring pattern: modern romance-investment scams increasingly rely on regulated or semi-regulated fiat-to-crypto payment infrastructure.

Once again, OpenPayd infrastructure reportedly appeared at the stage where victim funds entered the crypto ecosystem.

2-Minute Overview

A new victim submission received by Scam-Or Project places an OpenPayd Malta IBAN directly inside the payment chain of a suspected crypto-investment scam.

This is not merely another online romance scam allegation. The reported facts suggest that fraud operators may have leveraged OpenPayd’s fiat-entry infrastructure to channel victim funds into cryptocurrency before dispersing them across wallets and exchanges.

According to the victim, she was approached through the dating application Bloom by an individual using the name “Allen Wilson,” who allegedly presented himself as an experienced forex trader. Communication later shifted to WhatsApp, where the victim reportedly received step-by-step trading instructions, screenshots, and guidance related to cryptocurrency transactions.

The victim claims she was instructed to:

  • Open and use a Crypto.com account
  • Create a Trust Wallet
  • Purchase and transfer crypto assets
  • Send funds onward to the alleged trading platform Ubsdfx.com

The total reported loss is estimated at approximately €60,000, including borrowed funds, between 29 April 2025 and early June 2025.

The victim further states that Austrian police later performed blockchain tracing and allegedly identified that the transferred crypto assets were fragmented across numerous exchanges and wallets.

A screenshot shared with Scam-Or Project appears to show a Crypto.com EUR deposit instruction using a Malta IBAN beginning with:

MT58 CFTE…

The screenshot also displays the BIC/SWIFT:

CFTEMTM1

The banking details shown correspond to OpenPayd Malta infrastructure used in the fiat-to-crypto deposit process.

Reported Payment Flow

Victim

OpenPayd Malta IBAN / CFTEMTM1

Crypto.com Cash Account

Trust Wallet

Ubsdfx.com

Multiple downstream wallets and exchanges

The core issue remains unchanged: crypto fraud operations require legitimate-looking payment rails.

Scammers do not rely solely on fake dating profiles, WhatsApp manipulation, fabricated dashboards, or blocked withdrawals. They also depend on:

  • SEPA-accessible IBANs
  • Crypto exchange funding systems
  • Wallet infrastructure
  • Fiat-to-crypto onboarding rails

This latest case aligns with the broader operational patterns described in OCCRP’s Scam Empire investigation and further supports earlier Scam-Or Project reporting regarding OpenPayd and the wider ecosystem connected to founder Ozan Özerk.

The central question is no longer whether scammers use fake trading platforms. The real question is why OpenPayd-linked IBAN infrastructure repeatedly surfaces in fraud-related payment paths.

Questions Raised For OpenPayd

This case raises several compliance and monitoring questions, including:

  • How was the Malta vIBAN infrastructure used in this transaction flow?
  • Were any AML or transaction-monitoring alerts triggered?
  • Were suspicious activity reports filed?
  • How many similar complaints reference CFTEMTM1?
  • What escalation procedures exist for suspected crypto-fraud activity?

The Operational Structure Of The Alleged Fraud

The reported scheme followed a familiar structure:

Stage Alleged Function
Fake romance profile Initial victim acquisition
WhatsApp communication Grooming and manipulation
OpenPayd Malta IBAN Fiat-entry payment rail
Crypto.com Fiat-to-crypto conversion
Trust Wallet Self-custody transfer layer
Ubsdfx.com Alleged fake trading environment

What The Screenshot Allegedly Shows

The screenshot provided to Scam-Or Project appears to display Crypto.com EUR deposit instructions.

Visible Details

Field Information Shown
Account holder Victim’s name
IBAN MT58 CFTE 2800 4000 0000 0000 45 31340
BIC/SWIFT CFTEMTM1
Bank address Level 3, 137 Spinola Road, St Julian’s, Malta
Country Malta (MT)
Deposit purpose EUR deposits into Crypto.com Cash Account via SEPA

The wording displayed in the screenshot reportedly states:

“Please use the information below to transfer EUR deposits into your Crypto.com Cash Account directly through your bank via SEPA.”

This suggests that the victim was instructed to send fiat funds into a crypto-exchange-linked account using a Malta-based vIBAN before transferring assets onward through Trust Wallet and eventually to Ubsdfx.com.

Understanding The vIBAN Structure

A virtual IBAN (vIBAN) is a payment identifier designed to resemble a conventional IBAN while operating through a centralized payment-account structure.

In legitimate exchange environments, vIBANs are commonly used for:

  • Customer deposit identification
  • Internal reconciliation
  • Segregated transaction tracking

The payer may see an IBAN appearing to belong personally to them, while the underlying funds are actually routed through a payment institution or master corporate account.

In the earlier OpenPayd/Klickl Europe-related material, OpenPayd reportedly explained that such vIBANs function as digital identifiers attached to a primary corporate account rather than standalone banking accounts.

Unlike the prior Klickl Europe cases, the current screenshot does not appear to reference Klickl Europe. Instead, it appears connected directly to Crypto.com deposit infrastructure using a Malta CFTE IBAN.

However, the broader fraud risk remains consistent.

The vIBAN-To-Crypto Fraud Sequence

Personal-looking IBAN

Crypto exchange funding

Self-custody wallet

Fake trading platform

Funds dispersed and lost

Key Case Information

Category Details
Case type Romance / pig-butchering crypto-investment scam
Initial contact Bloom dating application
Alleged scammer identity “Allen Wilson”
Communication channel WhatsApp
Fraud narrative Forex and crypto trading profits
IBAN structure Malta IBAN beginning MT58 CFTE…
BIC/SWIFT CFTEMTM1
Deposit context Crypto.com Cash Account / SEPA
Exchange layer Crypto.com
Wallet layer Trust Wallet
Destination platform Ubsdfx.com
Reported losses Approximately €60,000
Timeline 29 April 2025 – early June 2025
Law enforcement Austrian police complaint reportedly filed
Blockchain tracing Funds allegedly dispersed across multiple wallets/exchanges
OpenPayd relevance Malta CFTE vIBAN infrastructure visible in deposit flow
Klickl relevance No current evidence connecting this case to Klickl Europe
Risk classification High-risk vIBAN-enabled crypto fraud

Payment Infrastructure Breakdown

Layer Entity / Tool Apparent Role Primary Risk
Victim acquisition Bloom Romance-scam entry point Emotional manipulation
Grooming “Allen Wilson” / WhatsApp Instruction and trust-building Social engineering
Fiat entry OpenPayd Malta SEPA funding rail False legitimacy through named IBAN
Exchange layer Crypto.com Fiat-to-crypto onboarding Legitimate infrastructure leveraged
Wallet layer Trust Wallet Self-custody transfer Reduced recovery options after transfer
Scam platform Ubsdfx.com Alleged fake investment platform Withdrawal denial
Laundering stage Multiple wallets/exchanges Fragmentation of proceeds Tracing complexity

Scam-Or Project Assessment

This case should currently be classified as a vIBAN-enabled crypto scam involving Crypto.com, Trust Wallet, and Ubsdfx.com — not as a Klickl Europe case.

That distinction is important.

In the earlier KXTRA and Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore investigations, available evidence suggested that funds were linked to corporate payment infrastructure associated with Klickl Europe.

In this case, the visible transaction route appears different:

OpenPayd Malta IBAN

Crypto.com

Trust Wallet

Ubsdfx.com

Nevertheless, the underlying operational model appears similar: fraud operators allegedly exploit legitimate payment and crypto infrastructure to gain victim trust and facilitate fund transfers.

The scammers do not necessarily control the exchange or payment institution itself. Instead, they weaponize existing rails.

This explains why OpenPayd remains central to ongoing investigative scrutiny. Scam-Or Project has repeatedly covered OpenPayd-related payment structures in elevated-risk transaction environments, while OCCRP’s Scam Empire reporting documented how international fraud networks depend heavily on payment intermediaries, crypto rails, and banking infrastructure.

According to OCCRP, leaked records allegedly showed fraud-related payments flowing through dozens of companies, including entities connected to Ozan Özerk, although OCCRP also stated there was no evidence that those companies knowingly processed fraudulent payments.

Core Compliance Questions

This latest case again raises several important questions:

  1. How are victims repeatedly being directed toward Malta-based vIBAN payment rails?
  2. What monitoring systems are triggered when large retail SEPA deposits fund crypto accounts?
  3. Are fraud reports escalated quickly enough to freeze assets?
  4. Are exchanges and payment facilitators preserving complete transaction records for investigators?
  5. How frequently does the same CFTE/OpenPayd infrastructure appear in crypto-fraud complaints?

Conclusion

This latest report adds another layer to the broader Scam-Or Project investigation into OpenPayd-linked vIBAN infrastructure.

At present, the matter appears to be:

  • A Crypto.com case
  • A Trust Wallet case
  • A Ubsdfx.com scam allegation
  • A Malta CFTE vIBAN payment-rail case

But the operational pattern remains consistent:

  • Fake identities attract victims
  • WhatsApp conversations build trust
  • vIBANs move fiat into crypto
  • Wallets transfer assets away
  • Fake platforms simulate profits
  • Withdrawals fail
  • Funds disappear across multiple wallets and exchanges

OCCRP described the ecosystem as the “Scam Empire.”

Scam-Or Project continues following the payment rails.

And once again, OpenPayd-linked infrastructure appears directly inside the victim’s reported payment path.

Share Information

If you have information regarding OpenPayd, Malta CFTE vIBAN structures, or related crypto-payment activity, you may share details through the Scam-Or Project Complaints.

Victims who transferred funds through OpenPayd-linked payment rails are also encouraged to provide documentation and transaction details for further analysis.

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