The OpenPayd–Klickl vIBAN Fraud Rail: KXTRA And Fake Peel Hunt Victim Files Reveal A Shared Payment Infrastructure

2-Minute Overview

The investigation conducted by Scam-Or Project has expanded well beyond the KXTRA / KKR Global Investment case. Newly reviewed victim correspondence together with OpenPayd GDPR disclosures indicates that the same OpenPayd and Klickl Europe payment structure also surfaced in a separate fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore investment operation.

This significantly alters the scope of the case.

A single fraudulent investment platform can often be dismissed as isolated “merchant abuse.” However, when multiple unrelated scam brands rely on the same payment architecture, the situation increasingly resembles a reusable fraud-collection infrastructure rather than an isolated compliance failure.

According to OpenPayd’s GDPR response, the company provides services exclusively to corporate clients rather than retail individuals. OpenPayd identified Klickl Europe as the relevant corporate customer connected to the victim transfers.

The response further explained that the IBAN provided to the victim was not a conventional personal IBAN, but a named virtual IBAN (vIBAN) attached to Klickl Europe’s corporate payment account. OpenPayd additionally stated that funds transferred to this vIBAN were ultimately credited into Klickl Europe’s corporate account and became the property of Klickl Europe once settled.

This directly supports the core Scam-Or Project assessment:

• OpenPayd supplied the vIBAN collection mechanism;
• Klickl Europe acted as the corporate account holder;
• victim deposits were routed into Klickl Europe’s infrastructure.

Importantly, the newly identified case was unrelated to KXTRA itself. The victim’s communication with OpenPayd explicitly referenced “Fraud via Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore” and demanded reimbursement of the transferred funds.

That allegation aligns with public warnings issued by the legitimate Peel Hunt organization. The authentic Peel Hunt has publicly stated that it does not conduct regulated investment activity through WhatsApp, LinkedIn, downloadable applications, or social-media channels. The firm also specifically warned that the PEELHUNTAICORE application is not connected to Peel Hunt.

The Emerging Pattern

The currently identified structure appears to show:

• KXTRA / KKR Global Investment functioning as one fraudulent investment frontend;
• Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore functioning as another;
• OpenPayd and Klickl Europe operating as the shared payment rail.

What OpenPayd’s GDPR Response Confirmed

1. Klickl Europe Was The Corporate Client

OpenPayd stated that its services are offered exclusively to corporate customers and that no direct contractual relationship existed with the individual victim. The GDPR response identified Klickl Europe as the relevant corporate client connected to the transaction flow.

2. The IBAN Was A Named vIBAN

According to OpenPayd, the assigned IBAN was not a traditional standalone IBAN. Instead, it was described as a named virtual IBAN connected to a primary corporate payment account.

OpenPayd stated that this specific vIBAN was linked directly to the payment account belonging to Klickl Europe.

3. Victim Information Came From Klickl Europe

OpenPayd also stated that personal data was obtained both from the sending bank and from Klickl Europe itself.

The company reportedly received:

• the victim’s full name;
• residential address;
• date of birth.

The GDPR response additionally stated that the victim had been onboarded onto the Klickl Europe platform and that a virtual IBAN was allocated in the victim’s name for payments intended to fund Klickl Europe’s account.

4. Funds Became Klickl Europe’s Property

One of the most important disclosures in the GDPR material was OpenPayd’s statement that:

• funds transferred to the vIBAN entered Klickl Europe’s corporate payment account;
• after settlement, those funds became the property of Klickl Europe.

This places Klickl Europe directly at the center of the victim-fund flow.

Understanding The vIBAN Structure

A virtual IBAN, commonly referred to as a vIBAN, resembles a standard IBAN but does not function as an independent bank account.

Typically, a vIBAN is connected to a master corporate account and serves as an internal reconciliation tool allowing incoming payments to be identified quickly.

In practical terms, the process appears to work as follows:

Victim sees a personalized IBAN → victim assumes the account is individual or protected → funds move into Klickl Europe’s corporate account → internal reconciliation occurs inside the platform.

This structure can create a misleading sense of security because the payer sees a personalized IBAN linked to their identity, even though the underlying beneficiary may still be a corporate account.

That is effectively the “vIBAN trap.”

Scam Frontends Linked To The Same Rail

Payment Rail Structure: OpenPayd And Klickl Europe

Revised Fraud-Rail Map

Common Collection Structure

Victim → OpenPayd named vIBAN → Klickl Europe corporate payment account → Klickl platform credit / transfer / conversion / settlement → unknown downstream recipient

Identified Frontend Variants

• KXTRA / KKR Global Investment → OpenPayd/Klickl vIBAN rail
• Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore → OpenPayd/Klickl vIBAN rail

While the fraudulent brands differ, the payment infrastructure appears materially similar.

Why The Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore Case Is Important

The legitimate Peel Hunt is a regulated UK investment banking firm (website) listed on the London Stock Exchange with offices at 100 Liverpool Street, London. The fraudulent “PEELHUNTAICORE” and “PHFINCORE” applications are not associated with the real company.

The significance of the Peelhuntaicore evidence lies in the fact that it suggests a second fraudulent investment operation relied on the same Klickl-linked vIBAN architecture.

If the evidence involved only KXTRA, the situation could potentially be framed as an isolated merchant-compliance issue. However, the emergence of another scam frontend connected to the same infrastructure raises broader concerns regarding repeatable collection mechanisms.

This also increases pressure on Klickl Europe to clarify:

• whether identical customers or counterparties were involved;
• whether the same wallet infrastructure was reused;
• whether common exchange accounts or OTC arrangements existed;
• whether internal ledgers connected the separate flows.

The central issue is no longer:

Was Klickl unintentionally exposed to one fraudulent operator?

The more important question now appears to be:

How did multiple investment scams route victim funds into Klickl Europe’s corporate account through OpenPayd vIBAN infrastructure?

Scam-Or Project Assessment

Scam-Or Project’s assessment is that Klickl Europe should now be viewed as both:

• a central evidence holder;
• and a potentially critical participant within the broader fraud rail.

Possible Scenarios

Even under the most favorable interpretation for Klickl Europe, the company would still possess key downstream transaction data.

If Klickl received the victim funds, it should know where those funds ultimately went.

Call For Victims And Whistleblowers

Scam-Or Project is currently gathering additional documentation relating to the broader OpenPayd / Klickl Europe vIBAN structure.

Particular interest exists regarding victims connected to:

• KXTRA;
• KKR Global Investment;
• Peelhuntaicore;
• fake Peel Hunt WhatsApp investment groups;
• any investment application using OpenPayd or Malta-linked IBANs;
• payment records referencing Klickl Europe;
• GDPR or DSAR responses received from OpenPayd;
• transaction references such as “Sweep to Primary Account.”

Relevant evidence may include:

• OpenPayd GDPR / DSAR responses;
• payment spreadsheets;
• assigned vIBAN details;
• payment confirmations;
• app screenshots;
• WhatsApp conversations;
• adviser phone numbers;
• police reports;
• regulator complaints;
• crypto-wallet addresses;
• transaction hashes;
• responses from Klickl Europe.

Victims may submit information individually or through the Scam-Or Project Complaints section.

Conclusion

This investigation has evolved far beyond a single fraudulent application.

• KXTRA represented one scam frontend.
• Peelhuntaicore represented another.
• The shared denominator appears to be the OpenPayd / Klickl Europe vIBAN payment rail.

OpenPayd has now confirmed that the victim-facing IBANs were named virtual IBANs connected to Klickl Europe’s corporate payment account. The company also confirmed that funds credited through those vIBANs became the property of Klickl Europe.

This places Klickl Europe at the center of the evidence chain.

If Klickl functioned only as an onboarding layer, it should disclose the downstream transaction data.

If Klickl operated closer to the fraud infrastructure, regulators and law-enforcement authorities may need to intervene.

And if OpenPayd enabled a reusable vIBAN structure that served multiple investment-fraud frontends, serious questions remain regarding transaction monitoring, AML oversight, and financial-crime controls.

The victims are seeking answers.

Scam-Or Project will continue tracing the rail.