GammaG: The Georgian Shadow Rail CoinsPaid Prefers to Keep Out of Sight

A newly surfaced whistleblower dossier adds further weight to prior reporting by Scam-Or Project regarding GammaG, a Georgian payment processor operating under the GammaG brand. While the material does not establish shared ownership with CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, or the broader Dream Finance ecosystem, it highlights something operationally significant.

According to the evidence, a merchant relationship that allegedly originated through CoinsPaid appears to have been redirected to GammaG. This relationship later deteriorated into a prolonged dispute over missing funds, repeated claims of “bank returns” without proof, and ultimately a notice that the servicing entity would be shut down.

In the current post-Lithuania regulatory landscape, such patterns are precisely what compliance professionals should closely examine.

Key Findings

• A whistleblower reports that a merchant seeking crypto payout solutions was initially onboarded via CoinsPaid but later contracted under GammaG.
• The merchant claims to have deposited $30,000 into its wallet, after which the funds became inaccessible for an extended period.
• Email correspondence shows GammaG repeatedly asserting that the funds had been returned by a banking partner, yet no documentary evidence was provided.
• In a separate communication, GammaG informed the client that the servicing legal entity would be shut down and the contract terminated due to “operational and compliance requirements across various jurisdictions.”
• These developments reinforce the working assumption that GammaG may have functioned as a substitute or continuation rail within the CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing / Dream Finance ecosystem.

The Merchant Trail: Where the Real Issues Surface

According to the whistleblower, the affected entity operates a YouTube-based creator payment network distributing revenue shares to partners. Some users opted to receive payouts in cryptocurrency, prompting the company to engage CoinsPaid.

However, instead of maintaining a transparent CoinsPaid relationship, the merchant reports being transitioned into a contractual arrangement with GammaG. After depositing $30,000, the funds allegedly became locked for nearly a year.

This situation goes beyond a routine support issue. It raises fundamental compliance questions:

• Which entity formally contracted the merchant?
• Who maintained control over the wallet?
• Which organization handled the funds?
• Who bore AML and regulatory responsibility?

Email Evidence Strengthens the Case

The documentation provided to Scam-Or Project supports the whistleblower’s claims.

In one exchange:

• GammaG stated that the funds had been returned by the bank and asked the merchant to confirm receipt.
• The merchant responded that no funds had arrived.
• GammaG indicated it had requested formal confirmation and would forward it once received.

However, no such confirmation appears in the materials. Instead, the merchant repeatedly escalated the issue, stating:

“We’ve received nothing yet.”

The merchant subsequently demanded proof and warned of public disclosure and potential criminal complaints.

This raises a critical compliance red flag. If funds are allegedly returned via a banking partner, a verifiable audit trail should exist.

Shutdown Notice Raises Further Concerns

A second email thread provides additional insight.

GammaG informed the merchant that:

• The legal entity providing services would be formally closed.
• Operations would cease.
• The contractual relationship would be terminated.

The stated reason:
“Operational and compliance requirements across various jurisdictions.”

This language suggests more than routine restructuring. It may indicate:

• Regulatory pressure
• Banking constraints
• Jurisdictional risks
• Migration to alternative operational structures

Combined with the unresolved funds issue, this points to instability within the servicing chain.

Notably, similar phrasing has appeared in communications from Dream Finance UAB during its Lithuanian suspension, as well as in liquidation notices in El Salvador and Poland. The pattern is consistent:

1. Regulatory pressure emerges
2. Entities shut down
3. Client funds remain “in transit”
4. Communication deteriorates into vague responses

How This Fits the Existing Scam-Or Project Hypothesis

Earlier investigations by Scam-Or Project already identified operational proximity between GammaG, CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, and the Dream Finance / SoftSwiss ecosystem.

The new whistleblower material does not contradict that analysis — it reinforces it.

The key detail:
The merchant claims it reached GammaG through CoinsPaid.

While this does not prove shared ownership, it strongly suggests operational linkage. GammaG appears sufficiently integrated into the CoinsPaid flow to act as:

• A contracting endpoint
• An operational substitute
• A fallback processing channel

This is exactly the type of structure investigators should scrutinize in high-risk sectors such as:

• Crypto processing
• Offshore gambling
• Cross-border merchant acquiring

The Dream Finance Context: Why GammaG Matters More Now

The broader regulatory environment is essential to understanding this case.

As previously reported, the Dream Finance Group — linked to CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing — withdrew from Lithuania at the end of 2025 amid tightening regulatory scrutiny.

Lithuania had long served as a preferred jurisdiction for crypto-payment structures. Once that route became constrained, alternative jurisdictions became necessary.

Georgia fits this role:

• Outside the EU’s tightening crypto regulatory perimeter
• Geographically and legally distanced from EU oversight
• Potentially suitable for higher-risk payment flows

This makes GammaG strategically relevant.

The whistleblower case provides a concrete example of a broader pattern:
When one regulatory route closes, activity shifts to another node within the network.

The GammaG – CoinsPaid – SoftSwiss Triangle

The wider ecosystem adds further context.

Publicly available information indicates:

• SoftSwiss stated that FinteqHub was developed by its PSP team
• Ivan Montik is listed as an adviser and mentor at CoinsPaid
• CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing operate within the Dream Finance Group

Scam-Or Project investigations have also identified:

• GammaG LLC (Georgia) appearing behind “CoinsPaid” deposit flows at offshore casinos such as Vegadream (Starscream Group)
• Merchant descriptors referencing “STARDUST GLOBAL CCS LTD (Starscream)”
• Joint references in iGaming support documentation (“CoinsPaid / GammaG”), suggesting operational integration

Structural Overview

The working hypothesis:
GammaG functions as a jurisdictional fallback mechanism — a continuation rail when EU-based structures become non-viable.

Conclusion: Another Critical Piece of the Puzzle

The whistleblower material does not provide a complete picture, but it adds a significant piece to the ongoing investigation.

It confirms that GammaG was:

• A real contractual counterparty
• Not merely a technical intermediary
• Directly involved in merchant fund handling

It also highlights a concerning pattern:

• Funds allegedly disappearing
• Unsupported claims of bank returns
• Lack of verifiable documentation
• Abrupt entity shutdown notices

In the assessment of Scam-Or Project, this strengthens the view that GammaG operates in close functional proximity to the CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing / Dream Finance ecosystem.

Within high-risk payment environments — particularly those involving offshore gambling and crypto — such hidden operational nodes often represent the true control points of financial flows.

GammaG should therefore be treated not as a peripheral entity, but as a priority subject in ongoing investigations into the real payment infrastructure behind CoinsPaid and SoftSwiss-linked operations.

Summary Data

Whistleblower Call

If you possess relevant materials related to GammaG, CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, Dream Finance, or SoftSwiss-linked payment structures, contact Scam-Or Project via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section.

Particularly relevant evidence includes:

• Merchant contracts and onboarding documents
• Wallet records and transaction histories
• Banking correspondence
• Settlement documentation
• KYB/KYC files
• Internal communications

Special attention is given to materials clarifying:

• The actual contracting entity
• Control over merchant funds
• Banking intermediaries involved
• Migration from Lithuanian entities to Georgian or alternative structures

Confidentiality is strictly maintained.