Contiant Update: Benelux Pay-by-Bank Exposure Sharpens Within the Yapily Casino Stack

In December 2025, Scam-Or Project identified Contiant Ltd (Bulgaria) as a technical open-banking intermediary positioned upstream of Yapily’s PSD2 infrastructure. The setup enables pay-by-bank deposits for offshore casino brands that appear to be marketed into jurisdictions where such offerings are restricted. Newly reviewed traffic intelligence now reveals a pronounced Benelux-oriented banking pattern and highlights SkyHills as a major traffic source feeding into Contiant’s payment flow.

Executive Overview

Recent traffic and referral data materially refine the earlier assessment. What previously appeared as a broadly EU-oriented open-banking gateway now shows clear geographic and banking concentration. The Netherlands emerges as the dominant traffic source, while outbound payment journeys consistently terminate at Belgian and Dutch retail banks, alongside Revolut’s open-banking authorization domain.

Core Observations

• Contiant (www.contiant.com) presents itself as a technical service provider (TSP), executing payment initiation through external regulated infrastructures, primarily Yapily.
• Similarweb data (December 2025) indicates that traffic to paywith.contiant.com is heavily concentrated in the Netherlands, with outbound destinations focused on Benelux banking institutions.
• Referral traffic into paywith.contiant.com is dominated by casino-related sources, with SkyHills identified as the largest single referrer in the updated dataset.
• SkyHills publicly discloses Igloo Ventures SRL (Costa Rica) as its operating entity, according to its published legal and policy documentation.
• Contiant promotes Open Banking / Pay-by-Bank as a card substitute, emphasizing instant settlement and the absence of chargebacks — features typically attractive to high-risk verticals, including online gambling.

Structural Risk Profile

The principal risk does not arise from any single casino domain, but from the overall transaction architecture:

Casino interface → paywith.contiant.com → Yapily consent and authorization environment → end-user bank approval

Prior observations include user-facing consent screens branded “Powered by Yapily”, indicating Yapily’s role in the authorization stage. This layered configuration can introduce operational and regulatory distance between the licensed payment rail and the gambling merchant, while transactions continue to be processed via regulated infrastructure.

For additional compliance context and structural background, readers may review the Contiant compliance profile on RatEx42, which outlines the entity’s observed payment role, positioning within open-banking flows, and associated risk indicators.

What the New Data Changes

The updated traffic intelligence shifts the narrative from a generic EU open-banking solution to a Benelux-focused banking corridor.

In the latest Similarweb snapshots (December 2025):

• The Netherlands accounts for the largest share of user traffic.
• Outbound payment redirections cluster around KBC (Belgium) and leading Dutch retail banks.
• Revolut’s OBA endpoint appears among the most frequent authorization destinations.

This pattern suggests deliberate checkout optimization for specific banking ecosystems, rather than incidental or evenly distributed European usage. From a compliance perspective, this represents a geo-risk and partner-risk escalation indicator.

Updated Mini Rail Map (December 2025)

Interpretation and Limitations

Benelux Banking Concentration

A gateway whose outbound authorization flows repeatedly terminate at Belgian and Dutch banks typically reflects intentional market alignment — namely, targeting regions where end users hold bank accounts — rather than random EU-wide traffic.

SkyHills as a Primary Traffic Source

The prominence of SkyHills as a referral source narrows merchant attribution. SkyHills’ own disclosures identify Igloo Ventures SRL (Costa Rica) as the operating entity, linking the traffic source to an offshore gambling structure.

No Allegation Against Banks or Rails

These findings do not constitute evidence of wrongdoing by any individual bank, payment rail, or infrastructure provider.

Due-Diligence Pressure Points

The data does, however, sharpen questions around:

• KYB and merchant classification at the Contiant ↔ Yapily interface
• Geo-blocking and restricted-market controls
• Prohibited-use enforcement for gambling merchants and their traffic sources

Gateway Reuse Claims

Assertions that the same Contiant gateway services additional offshore casino brands — including operators linked to Curaçao or Costa Rica — are plausible given observed gateway reuse patterns. However, such claims require primary-source confirmation, including:

• Checkout and redirect captures
• Merchant identifiers
• Contracting-party disclosures in T&Cs
• Settlement descriptors and payment references

Call for Information — Scam-Or Project Whistleblower Section

Are you connected to Contiant, Yapily, Revolut, a Benelux bank, a PSP, or a gambling compliance function?

We are seeking primary documentary evidence, including (PII redacted where applicable):

• Partner and processing agreements
• KYB and onboarding documentation
• Merchant approval communications
• Consent and authorization screens (“Powered by Yapily”)
• Redirect and host logs
• Payee, IBAN, and descriptor mappings

Submissions can be made securely via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section.