Revolut Repeatedly Appearing in Pay-by-Bank Casino Deposits
Open-Banking Payment Flows Linked to Offshore Gambling Access
Payment-flow testing and casino mystery-shopping conducted by Scam-Or Project continue to expose a recurring technical configuration involving Revolut. In multiple cases, Revolut has been identified as the final funding bank for offshore casino deposits, even where the respective gambling platforms appear to operate without authorization in parts of the European Union.
Rather than relying on card processing, these deposits are consistently routed through open-banking pay-by-bank mechanisms, positioning Revolut within payment initiation chains used by high-risk gambling operators.
Contiant and Yapily as Routing Layers
A commonly observed transaction sequence involves a combination of Contiant and Yapily as intermediaries. The process typically unfolds as follows:
- the player initiates a deposit from an online casino cashier;
- the transaction is redirected to paywith.contiant.com;
- the user is prompted to approve access via a consent screen labeled “Authorize Yapily Connect UAB”;
- the flow concludes inside the Revolut environment.
Technical traces collected during these flows reference oba.revolut.com, indicating direct interaction with Revolut’s open-banking infrastructure.
Additional Exposure via UtPay
Separately, Scam-Or Project has documented cases in which Revolut or Revolut Pay was presented as a payment option at checkout through the UtPay gateway. These checkout integrations were linked to gambling brands connected to Santeda, including Donbet and Rolletto.
This form of exposure is notable given established compliance standards that require payment institutions to restrict financial access to unlicensed gambling operators in regulated EU markets.
A previously published analysis has already outlined the technical relationship between UtPay and Revolut in this context.
Oversight Failure or Systemic Tolerance?
The repeated reuse of identical payment rails raises unresolved compliance questions. Based on current observations, several explanations remain possible:
- insufficient KYB and partner oversight across intermediary layers;
- fragmented accountability created by multi-entity payment chains;
- or a structural environment in which high-risk gambling volumes are implicitly tolerated when routed through open-banking frameworks.
At this stage, no conclusion regarding deliberate intent can be established. However, the consistency of the observed routing patterns suggests that these are not isolated anomalies.
Gambling Block Statements and Practical Outcomes
Revolut publicly promotes a Gambling Block feature and states that regulatory requirements in certain countries obligate it to block transactions involving illegal gambling operators (Source: Revolut).
Nevertheless, documented cases indicate that open-banking payment initiation continues to function as an alternative channel through which offshore casinos operating illegally can receive customer funds, effectively bypassing traditional card-based controls.
Observed Payment Rail Overview
Timeframe: October–December 2025 (UTC)
| Component | Description | Observation |
|---|---|---|
| Banking Endpoint | Revolut (oba.revolut.com) | Indicated |
| Payment Intermediary | Contiant (paywith.contiant.com) | Confirmed |
| Payment Method | Open Banking / Pay-by-Bank (PIS) | Confirmed |
| Funding Bank | Revolut selected by user | Confirmed / Indicated |
| PISP | Yapily Connect UAB | Confirmed |
| Checkout Gateway | UtPay | Confirmed |
Scam-Or Project Whistleblower
Scam-Or Project invites players, compliance specialists, and industry insiders to submit supporting materials, including:
- casino cashier and consent screen screenshots;
- redirect URLs and intermediary domains;
- Revolut transaction references and payment descriptors;
- partner onboarding or KYB documentation (with personal data removed).
Submissions can be made confidentially via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section.
