THE WIRECARD SMOKING GUN

Ivan Montik Identified in Munich Trial as Court Rejects SoftSwiss “Non-PSP” Narrative

Testimony delivered by SoftSwiss founder Ivan Montik during the Munich Wirecard criminal proceedings has fundamentally altered the legal framing of the SoftSwiss ecosystem. Under questioning, Montik attempted to portray his group as a neutral B2B technology supplier. However, the presiding judge openly dismissed this position, concluding that the described activities correspond to unlicensed payment service provision involving transaction volumes measured in the hundreds of millions of euros.

Core Facts Established in Court

• A sworn witness stated that Direx N.V. previously operated as Softswiss N.V. and later rebranded as Dama N.V., with all entities incorporated in Curaçao.
• Ivan Montik acknowledged that Direx handled revenues processed via Wirecard, which were subsequently distributed to casino operators, while denying that Direx functioned as a PSP.
• The presiding judge directly rejected this denial, stating that he “knows by now what qualifies as a PSP and what does not.”
• Defense counsel introduced transaction data indicating approximately €422 million credited to Direx accounts, followed by systematically rounded outbound transfers.
• Montik claimed he had no direct knowledge of these movements and referred responsibility to a finance executive identified as “Ivan Schubowski (or similar).”
• Prior investigative work by Scam-Or Project has documented the transactional links between SoftSwiss, Direx/Dama, and Wirecard, as well as the underlying casino white-label infrastructure.
• SoftSwiss currently presents its regulated footprint through Stable Aggregator Limited, licensed by the Malta Gaming Authority under MGA/B2B/942/2022.

Why the September 2025 Testimony Matters

Montik’s appearance in court in September 2025 marks a decisive shift from speculative analysis to judicially recorded admissions. For years, investigative reporting has reconstructed the SoftSwiss–Direx–Dama structure through payment flows and corporate records. In Munich, Montik confirmed under oath that these entities did not operate in isolation but represent successive iterations within a unified operational system.

This is legally significant because the activity described in court moves beyond software provision. An entity that receives pooled player funds from a regulated processor such as Wirecard and reallocates those funds across multiple third-party casino operators is, in functional terms, performing payment intermediation—regardless of how the arrangement is described in internal documentation.

The Court Rejects the “B2B Only” Claim

The most consequential moment of the hearing occurred when Montik attempted to distance his companies from payment services. While he insisted that SoftSwiss delivered only technical solutions, the judge intervened and explicitly rejected the argument, underscoring that the court understands the distinction between software vendors and Payment Service Providers.

This intervention effectively places the SoftSwiss–Direx–Dama structure within the scope of unlicensed PSP activity. By channeling gambling revenues through Wirecard and redistributing them to offshore casino entities, the system operated as a de facto financial intermediary. This finding mirrors prior Scam-Or Project assessments that SoftSwiss does not merely sell code but also facilitates opaque financial routing for high-risk gambling operations.

Investigative findings further indicate that Dream Finance Group, operating CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing, belongs to the broader commercial environment associated with Ivan Montik, who has publicly described himself as a co-founder. Available information suggests that this ecosystem has attracted capital from Russian investors.

Simultaneously, whistleblowers and multiple online reports have repeatedly raised concerns regarding money-laundering exposure within structures connected to SoftSwiss. Against this backdrop, Montik’s sworn statements align with the long-identified pattern of an integrated “casino, white-label, and payments” model. Within this configuration, Dream Finance appears to function as a significant crypto-payment routing component.

It is notable that Dream Finance recently suspended its crypto-asset services in Lithuania, at least on a temporary basis.

The €422 Million Transaction Pattern

Evidence disclosed in court showed that roughly €422 million was credited to Direx accounts. These inflows were followed by recurring, rounded outbound transfers—patterns commonly associated with automated redistribution systems or money-laundering typologies.

Montik’s claim of ignorance regarding these flows, despite his executive position, and his reliance on a finance director as an explanation, appears increasingly implausible given both the magnitude and regularity of the transactions.

A Regulatory Fault Line: Malta Versus Curaçao

Montik’s testimony places the Malta Gaming Authority in a difficult position. While SoftSwiss operates publicly through the MGA-licensed Stable Aggregator Limited, Montik confirmed that this structure is operationally intertwined with Dama N.V., a Curaçao-based entity frequently linked to grey-market gambling activity.

The court record suggests that a European-licensed entity may have served as a regulatory front for a far broader offshore operation. This raises serious questions about whether MGA licensing was used to provide legitimacy to activities that would otherwise fall outside EU regulatory standards.

Final Assessment

The Munich proceedings substantiate long-standing warnings published by Scam-Or Project. The SoftSwiss white-label framework cannot be viewed solely as a technological service; it functions as a protective layer for unlicensed payment processing. As the Wirecard trial continues to dismantle entrenched narratives within European fintech and iGaming, regulatory accountability—particularly concerning the SoftSwiss–Dama linkage—will likely come under intensified scrutiny.

Whistleblower Information

If you have insight into the internal financial mechanisms of SoftSwiss, Dama N.V., or Stable Aggregator Limited, your information can help expose the underlying shadow infrastructure. Documents and tips may be submitted via the Scam-Or Project whistleblower section. Anonymity and source protection are ensured.