Betify Payment Rails Review: Offshore Casino Funding Network, Open Banking Chokepoints, and Opaque Merchant Structures

A May 2026 review conducted by Scam-Or Project identified a significantly expanded payment architecture behind Betify compared to the platform’s August 2024 setup. While the visible corporate structure changed from Altacore N.V. / Altaprime Limited to Fortuna Games N.V. / Deltaprime Limited, the broader operational model appears largely unchanged.

The latest review indicates that EU users could still access and initiate deposits to the offshore casino through a fragmented network of payment processors, open banking gateways, crypto-conversion flows, wallets, card processors, voucher systems, and third-party payees that obscure the actual gambling beneficiary.

Key Findings

Corporate Structure Was Replaced, But the Model Stayed the Same

In the August 2024 review, Betify was associated with:

• Altacore N.V. (Curaçao)
• Altaprime Limited (Cyprus)

In the May 2026 review, the visible entities became:

• Fortuna Games N.V. (Curaçao)
• Deltaprime Limited (Cyprus)

Although the company names changed, the jurisdictional arrangement remained substantially identical: a Curaçao-based offshore gambling operator combined with a Cyprus-facing payment and EEA representation layer.

EU Users Could Still Access and Fund Accounts

During the May 6, 2026 simulated review, registration and deposit flows remained available from EU jurisdictions despite no verified evidence that Betify possessed the necessary gambling licenses in those territories.

Open Banking Flow Exposed InstantBankPayment and Yapily

The bank-transfer route directed users to:

• checkout.instantbankpayment.com

The interface displayed bank-selection screens together with Yapily Connect authorization terms.

The Revolut authorization page specifically referenced:

• Yapily Connect UAB

This Lithuanian regulated payment institution is supervised by the Bank of Lithuania under authorization number LB002045.

The review raises questions regarding:

• merchant onboarding,
• transaction-purpose verification,
• AML screening,
• and jurisdictional controls.

Passpoint Sp. z o.o. Appeared as the Payee

In the Revolut and Wise bank-transfer flow, the visible recipient was not Betify, Fortuna Games N.V., or Deltaprime Limited.

Instead, the payee shown was:

• Passpoint Sp. z o.o. (Poland)

This creates a notable merchant-of-record opacity issue because the visible payment recipient differs from the gambling brand presented to players.

Yapily’s Role in InstantBankPayment Remains Unclear

The screenshots confirmed that Yapily authorization and legal disclosures appeared inside the flow. However, the evidence did not conclusively establish whether Yapily owns or directly controls checkout.instantbankpayment.com.

Further clarification would be required.

MiFinity Deposits Used Buscarar LLC

The MiFinity payment rail displayed:

• Buscarar LLC

as the recipient instead of Betify or the named operator entities.

This adds another intermediary layer between the player and the actual gambling beneficiary.

Skrill and Neteller Functioned as Fake-FIAT Crypto Rails

One of the most significant findings involved Skrill and Neteller.

Users selecting familiar wallet payment methods were redirected to:

• Nylo
• app.nylo.pro

The transaction was framed as a crypto purchase and transfer rather than a direct fiat wallet payment.

The user was required to confirm:

• the purchase of cryptocurrency,
• and the transfer of that crypto to a specified wallet address.

The reviewed screens did not disclose:

• the origin of the crypto,
• the owner of the destination wallet,
• or the ultimate beneficiary.

Nylo Operated as a Crypto-Purchase Intermediary

Nylo publicly presents itself as a payment gateway supporting multi-currency transactions through its own infrastructure and partners.

The reviewed Betify flow showed Nylo acting as a conversion intermediary between:

• Skrill / Neteller
• and downstream crypto transfers.

ChainValley’s Role Was Not Confirmed

While ChainValley has appeared in similar fake-FIAT casino payment structures in other investigations, the May 2026 review did not confirm ChainValley’s direct involvement in the Betify flow.

Skrill eps Rail Displayed Deskimopay

The eps payment rail powered by Skrill displayed:

• Deskimopay

as the recipient rather than the gambling operator itself.

Card Payments Used a Multi-Layer Routing Structure

The observed card-payment chain was:

The tested payment showed:

• “BLUETECH GBP”

as the card descriptor and recipient reference.

This creates additional concerns regarding:

• descriptor opacity,
• acquiring relationships,
• payment facilitation,
• and transaction coding transparency.

Binance Pay Was Routed Through CryptonBTC

The Binance Pay option first redirected users through:

• pay2.cryptonbtc.com

before reaching Binance Pay itself.

Public information regarding CryptonBTC remains extremely limited.

Flexepin Was Available as a Voucher Deposit Option

The cashier also included:

• Flexepin

which adds a prepaid-style, cash-like funding mechanism to the overall payment stack.

Evidence Assessment

Then vs Now: Betify Payment Architecture

Core Finding 1: Offshore Structure Was Repackaged

The visible migration from Altacore/Altaprime to Fortuna/Deltaprime should not automatically be interpreted as remediation.

The central issue remains unchanged if EU consumers can still:

• register,
• deposit funds,
• and access gambling services

through payment infrastructure that does not transparently identify the actual merchant or gambling beneficiary.

From a compliance perspective, this kind of restructuring should trigger enhanced due diligence by payment providers and banking partners.

Core Finding 2: Open Banking Flow and Passpoint Sp. z o.o.

The open banking rail directed users into a flow involving:

• InstantBankPayment,
• Yapily Connect UAB,
• Revolut,
• Wise,
• and Passpoint Sp. z o.o.

Polish corporate registry data identifies Passpoint Sp. z o.o. under KRS 0001139121. Publicly accessible company information and LinkedIn-linked references associate the entity with Adejuwon Oyebanjo (LinkedIn) and Kelechi Uchegbulem (LinkedIn).

Core Finding 3: Fake-FIAT Crypto Conversion

The Skrill and Neteller rails represented one of the strongest findings of the review.

Although the user selected what appeared to be standard wallet payments, the underlying transaction was actually structured as:

1. crypto purchase,
2. crypto transfer,
3. onward routing to undisclosed wallet infrastructure.

This structure potentially changes the regulatory and AML profile of the transaction entirely.

Core Finding 4: MiFinity and Buscarar LLC

MiFinity deposits displayed Buscarar LLC rather than the operator itself.

Core Finding 5: eps/Skrill and Deskimopay

The eps rail powered by Skrill exposed another unrelated recipient layer through:

• Deskimopay

Local bank-transfer systems such as eps and MyBank are generally perceived by users as traditional banking rails.

Core Finding 6: Card Routing Through Multiple Intermediaries

The Visa payment chain involved several intermediate domains and processing layers before ultimately surfacing:

• BLUETECH GBP

as the descriptor.

Core Finding 7: Binance Pay and CryptonBTC

The Binance Pay route involved:

• CryptonBTC,
• pay2.cryptonbtc.com,
• and Binance Pay.

Compliance Analysis

1. Merchant-of-Record Opacity

The dominant pattern across the reviewed rails was the separation between:

• the gambling brand,
• the visible payee,
• and the actual transaction recipient.

Users encountered names such as:

• Passpoint,
• Buscarar LLC,
• Deskimopay,
• Nylo,
• BLUETECH GBP

instead of the named gambling operator.

This appears to be the core compliance concern throughout the architecture.

2. Regulated Chokepoints Exist Inside the Flow

The most significant exposure may not be the offshore casino itself, but the regulated providers facilitating the rails, including:

• Yapily Connect UAB,
• Revolut,
• Wise,
• MiFinity,
• Skrill,
• Neteller,
• Paysafe,
• Binance Pay,
• SegoPay,
• Axipays,
• and associated card-acquiring infrastructure.

These entities represent the critical supervision and AML chokepoints.

3. Fake-FIAT Structures Increase AML Complexity

The Nylo-based crypto conversion structure blurred the distinction between:

• fiat deposits,
• wallet funding,
• crypto purchases,
• and crypto transfers.

This creates material risks related to:

• AML monitoring,
• sanctions compliance,
• source-of-funds verification,
• and travel-rule obligations.

4. Open Banking Rails Require Heightened Oversight

Account-to-account open banking rails are:

• fast,
• difficult to reverse,
• and often less dispute-oriented than card payments.

When used for offshore gambling flows, payment providers and bank endpoints face elevated compliance obligations.

5. Descriptor and Payee Mismatch

The repeated appearance of unrelated descriptors and third-party recipients should trigger enhanced scrutiny by:

• banks,
• acquirers,
• PSPs,
• card schemes,
• wallet providers,
• and open banking operators.

Conclusion

The May 2026 Betify review does not indicate a simplified or remediated payment structure.

Instead, the evidence points to a broader and more fragmented architecture involving:

• open banking rails,
• fake-FIAT crypto conversions,
• card-processing intermediaries,
• Binance Pay routing,
• voucher systems,
• and multiple opaque third-party payees.

Although the visible corporate wrapper changed from:

• Altacore N.V. / Altaprime Limited

to:

• Fortuna Games N.V. / Deltaprime Limited

the underlying risk profile appears materially similar.

The strongest regulatory pressure points are not only the offshore gambling operators themselves, but also the payment providers and intermediaries enabling access to EU consumers while obscuring:

• merchant identity,
• transaction purpose,
• and settlement beneficiaries.

Whistleblower Request

Scam-Or Project invites:

• PSP employees,
• compliance officers,
• former Betify insiders,
• crypto-payment specialists,
• bank investigators,
• wallet-provider employees,
• and payment orchestration experts

to provide confidential information regarding:

• Betify,
• Fortuna Games N.V.,
• Deltaprime Limited,
• Altacore N.V.,
• Altaprime Limited,
• Passpoint Sp. z o.o.,
• Nylo,
• Buscarar LLC,
• Deskimopay,
• BLUETECH GBP,
• InstantBankPayment,
• Yapily Connect UAB,
• Revolut,
• Wise,
• MiFinity,
• Skrill,
• Neteller,
• Paysafe,
• Binance Pay,
• CryptonBTC,
• SegoPay,
• Axipays,
• and related settlement accounts or wallet infrastructure.

Information may be submitted confidentially through the Scam-Or Project Complaints.