Who Controls Klickl? The Chinese-Linked Polish VASP Embedded In The OpenPayd Fraud Rails

2-Minute Overview

Recent OpenPayd payment files reviewed by Scam-Or Project reveal a recurring transaction pattern tied to Klickl Europe Sp. z o.o. Victim deposits sent to OpenPayd vIBANs were repeatedly routed onward to the Polish crypto entity using the reference “Sweep to Primary Account.”

The evidence suggests that Klickl Europe was not simply an incidental recipient. The Polish company appears to function as the EU-facing node of a broader crypto-finance network associated with Xu Zhao, also publicly referenced as Michael (Xu) Zhao — a figure linked to Klickl, IDCM, VGPay, Crypto 1 Acquisition Corp, and C1 Fund.

This places the Polish VASP inside a much larger international structure spanning Poland, the UAE, Canada, Hong Kong, and U.S.-linked crypto investment entities.

OpenPayd Files Reveal Consistent Sweep Structure

According to multiple victim payment summaries, the operational flow followed the same structure:

1. Victims transferred funds into OpenPayd-issued named vIBANs.
2. Funds entered the OpenPayd infrastructure under BIC CFTEMTM1.
3. The balances were rapidly moved onward.
4. The beneficiary was repeatedly listed as Klickl Europe Sp. z o.o.
5. The transfer reference stated: “Sweep to Primary Account.”

The Humer case reportedly showed four separate Payins totaling more than €100,000, all allegedly redirected to Klickl Europe through the same sweep mechanism.

Scam-Or Project has identified the same routing pattern in files linked to the KXTRA and fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore investment schemes.

OpenPayd GDPR Response Raises Further Questions

A GDPR disclosure from OpenPayd reportedly confirmed that the IBANs shown to victims were not personal bank accounts, but virtual IBANs connected to Klickl Europe’s master corporate account.

OpenPayd allegedly stated that once the funds were credited, ownership transferred to Klickl Europe. This detail is highly significant because it places Klickl Europe as the economic recipient of the funds rather than a passive intermediary inside the payment chain.

Klickl Is Far More Than A Small Polish VASP

Public Klickl disclosures present the company as a global crypto-finance and payment ecosystem rather than a simple local VASP registration.

Klickl Pay markets itself as a “multi-jurisdictional virtual asset service provider” offering:

• Merchant payment solutions
• Fiat and crypto collection
• Stablecoin payments
• Cross-border transfers
• Wallet infrastructure
• API integrations
• Custody and exchange services

The broader Klickl network includes multiple domains and business units, including:

These platforms collectively point toward a sophisticated international crypto-payment ecosystem rather than a standalone Polish entity.

The Control Structure Leads Back To Xu Zhao

Polish corporate filings reportedly identify Xu Zhao (LinkedIn) as:

• President of the management board
• Beneficial owner
• Sole shareholder of Klickl Europe Sp. z o.o.

At the same time, U.S. SEC-linked materials and public corporate records connect Michael (Xu) Zhao to:

• Klickl
• International Digital Currency Markets (IDCM)
• VGPay
• Crypto 1 Acquisition Corp
• C1 Fund

Public Leadership And Compliance Figures

Klickl publicly lists multiple executives, advisors, and compliance personnel connected to its operations.

Publicly Listed Figures

The company also references advisors including:

• Dr. Najam Kidwai (LinkedIn)
• Andrew Au
• Nina Shapiro
• Mo Shaikh

Scam-Or Project does not allege that these individuals participated in any fraud operation. However, if they are publicly presented as senior management, compliance officers, or advisors, questions naturally arise regarding transaction monitoring, onboarding procedures, and awareness of the OpenPayd-linked payment flows.

The Wider Klickl / Zhao Network

The structure surrounding Klickl extends far beyond Poland.

The overall structure resembles an interconnected crypto-finance ecosystem operating across multiple regulatory environments.

Scam-Or Project Assessment

Based on the currently available documentation, several investigative conclusions emerge:

Working Hypothesis 1 — EU Collection Node

Klickl Europe appears to have functioned as the EU-facing collection and settlement layer for victim funds entering through OpenPayd vIBAN infrastructure.

Working Hypothesis 2 — Crypto On-Ramp Layer

The Polish entity may have served as an on-ramp into crypto wallets, exchanges, OTC desks, or settlement systems connected to fraud operators behind KXTRA and fake Peel Hunt / Peelhuntaicore.

Working Hypothesis 3 — Broader International Integration

The evidence suggests that Klickl Europe was not acting independently, but as part of a wider Zhao-linked network spanning Poland, UAE, Hong Kong, Canada, and U.S.-linked corporate structures.

Working Hypothesis 4 — Downstream Visibility

If Klickl Europe received and controlled the funds, the organization should theoretically possess:

• Customer onboarding records
• Wallet mappings
• Ledger entries
• Exchange destinations
• OTC settlement data
• Compliance monitoring records
• Transaction tracing information

If such information cannot be produced, scrutiny over the structure is likely to intensify.

Why Regulators May View This As A Cross-Border Network

The emerging structure appears to combine:

• OpenPayd vIBAN infrastructure in Malta
• A Polish VASP entity
• Crypto settlement systems
• UAE-regulated positioning
• U.S.-linked capital-market entities
• Hong Kong and China-linked crypto connections

That creates a potentially significant cross-border compliance issue involving payment rails, virtual asset onboarding, and alleged fraud-linked transaction flows.

Whistleblower Request

Scam-Or Project requests information from:

• Klickl insiders
• OpenPayd staff
• Exchange employees
• Compliance officers
• Wallet tracing specialists
• Victims
• Law-enforcement contacts

Relevant materials include:

• Klickl onboarding documents
• OpenPayd–Klickl agreements
• Wallet addresses
• Exchange account data
• Transaction hashes
• SAR / STR filings
• Internal compliance communications
• KXTRA or Peelhuntaicore platform screenshots
• Records involving Xu Zhao, Michael (Xu) Zhao, Ben Huang, Sanne Ke, Dermot Mayes, Alihan Ekesan, IDCM, VGPay, Crypto 1, or C1 Fund.